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Article
Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders
FREDRICK E. VARS
Thousands of sex offenders in the United States are being held
indefinitely under civil commitment programs. The analysis in this Article
suggests that none (or precious few) belong there. Specifically, in a large
dataset, an instrument as good as the one most widely used by experts (the
"Static-99") could not identify even one sex offender who met the legal
standards for commitment. Supplementing such instruments with
additional information does not appear to improve matters, so the failure
of the instrument is profoundly disturbing.
There are three possible responses to this failure: (1) improve
instruments to meet existing standards; (2) lower the existing standards; or
(3) abandon sex offender civil commitment. This Article focuses on the
first response, identifying and correcting flaws in the most widely-used
instrument. But the greater significance of the Article is to reframe the
debate around the other two potential responses. Can we predict the
future well enough to justify the indefinite detention of "dangerous"
people?
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Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders
FREDRICK E. VARS*
[F]rom a legal point of view there is nothing inherently
unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.
- Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)
Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.
- Neils Bohr (Danish Physicist)
I. INTRODUCTION
Preventive detention to protect public safety is an old idea, which has
recently expanded in scope.' Two well-established justifications for civil
confinement are mental illness and contagious disease.2 A more dramatic
example is the now widely discredited internment of Japanese Americans
during World War 11.3  As the internment case well illustrates, the great
difficulty with preventive detention is accurately identifying truly
dangerous individuals. This Article focuses on that problem in an area
where the assessment of future dangerousness is particularly rigorous: sex
offender civil commitment. Even here the prediction problem may be
intractable.
Thousands of convicted sex offenders remain in custody after their
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1 Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429-31, 1447-49 (2001) (describing the shift over the
past several decades from punishment to the prevention of future violations through incarceration).
2 Id. at 1444 ("Most jurisdictions allow civil commitment of persons who are dangerous because
of mental illness, drug dependency, or contagious disease.").
3 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 542 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he Emergency
Detention Act of 1950 ... was repealed in 1971 out of fear that it could authorize a repetition of the
World War II internment of citizens of Japanese ancestry; Congress meant to preclude another episode
like the one described in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).").
prison terms expire.4 As of March 2010, nineteen states and the federal
government had laws authorizing the civil commitment of certain sex
offenders. 5  Committed individuals are rarely released.6  Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court has upheld civil commitment laws against
various constitutional challenges.7 A common requirement for civil
commitment is future dangerousness.8 The two primary methods of
determining the likelihood of recidivism are clinical judgment and so-
called actuarial risk assessment instruments ("ARAIs"). 9 Studies have
shown ARAIs to be more accurate.' ° The most widely used ARAI is the
Static-99," which is the focus of this Article.
4 See Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at Al ("About 2,700 pedophiles, rapists and other sexual offenders are
already being held indefinitely, mostly in special treatment centers, under so-called civil commitment
programs .... ).
5 Keith Matheny, Releases of Sexually Violent Predators Anger Local Areas, USA TODAY (Mar.
4, 2010), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/20 10-03-03-predator-housing__N.htm (last
accessed July 14, 2010); see also 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006). Although the federal statute has been held
unconstitutional by some courts, see, e.g., United States v. Wilkinson, 626 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D. Mass.
2009), the Supreme Court held it to be a constitutional exercise of power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010). The Court assumed, without
deciding, the statute's constitutionality under other provisions, like the Due Process Clause.
6 John Q. La Fond, The Costs of Enacting a Sexual Predator Law and Recommendations for
Keeping Them From Skyrocketing, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS
OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 288 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La Fond eds., 2003).
7 E.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (upholding, against a due process challenge,
state-imposed preventive detention of dangerous sex offenders, but only if there is a lack of control
determination); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (holding that the "Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Act comports with due process requirements and neither runs afoul of double jeopardy
principles nor constitutes an exercise in impermissible ex post facto lawmaking").
SE.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357 ("Commitment proceedings can be initiated only when a
person 'has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense,' and 'suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of
sexual violence."') (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994)); see also Robert Prentky et al.,
Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 357,
357-58 (2006) (examining the most critical problems that occur at the intersection of law and science
in the sexually violent predator commitment law context).
9 Debra A. Pinals et al., Violent Risk Assessment, in SEX OFFENDERS: IDENTIFICATION, RISK
ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, & LEGAL ISSUES 70 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds., 2009). Some scholars
advocate clinically adjusted actuarial assessments. Id at 55. Others strongly disagree with this
approach, and continue to advocate traditional clinical judgment. See Stephen D. Hart et al., Precision
of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments: Evaluating the 'Margins of Error' of Group v. Individual
Predictions of Violence, 190 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY s60, s60, s64 (2007) (concluding that ARAI use
should be limited to situations that pose low-risk circumstances because of their inadequacy in making
accurate predictions about individuals).
10 Pinals et al., supra note 9, at 54; Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Field Validity of the Static-99 and
MnSOST-R Among Sex Offenders Evaluated for Civil Commitment as Sexually Violent Predators, 15
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 278, 278-81 (2009) ("ARAIs designed to predict sexual reoffense . . .
clearly outperformed unstructured professional judgment. ... ). But see Thomas R. Litwack,
Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 409, 409-10
(2001) (examining the relative merits of actuarial versus clinical assessments of dangerousness and
concluding that it is premature to replace clinical risk assessments with actuarial assessments).
1" Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders: A
Survey of Experts, 19 SEX ABUSE 425, 434, 448 (2007); Jacqueline Waggoner et al., A Respecification
of Hanson's Updated Static-99 Experience Table that Controls for the Effects of Age on Sexual
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The Static-99 is a ten-item instrument. The coding form is shown in
Table 1:12
Table 1. Static-99 Coding Form
Question Risk Factor Codes Score
I Young Aged 25 or older 0
Aged 18 - 24.99 1
2 Ever Lived With Ever lived with lover for at least
two years?
Yes 0
No 1
3 Index Non-Sexual Violence- No 0
Any Convictions Yes 1
4 Prior Non-Sexual Violence- No 0
Any Convictions Yes 1
5 Prior Sex Offenses Charges Convictions
None None 0
1-2 1 1
3-5 2-3 2
6+ 4+ 3
6 Prior Sentencing Dates 3 or less 0
(Excluding Index) 4 or more 1
7 Any Convictions for Non- No 0
Contact Sex Offenses Yes 1
8 Any Unrelated Victims No 0
Yes 1
9 Any Stranger Victims No 0
Yes 1
10 Any Male Victims13  No 0
Yes 1
Add up scores from individual
Total Score risk factors
Translating Static-99 Scores into Risk Categories
Score Label for Risk Category
0,1 Low
2, 3 Moderate-Low
4,5
6 plus
Moderate-High
High
Risk categories can be further translated into recidivism rates based on
figures from the sample used to develop the instrument:14
Recidivism Among Young Offenders, 7 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 305, 305-06 (2008) ("The original
version of Static-99 . . . is the most widely used actuarial table for the prediction of sexual
recidivism.").
12 R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk Assessment for Sex Offenders: A
Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales, 24 LAW & HUMAN BEtAV. 119, 133-35 app. 1 (2000); Andrew
Harris et al., Static-99 Coding Rules Revised-2003 1, 3-7, 9, 11, available at http://www.static99.org
(last visited July 1, 2011).
13 The Static-99 is designed for male offenders only. The disparate impact of the Static-99 on
homosexual and bisexual offenders is beyond the scope of this Article.
"4 Estimates based on Hanson & Thornton, supra note 12, at 129 tbl.5.
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Table 2. 15-Year Recidivism By Static-99 Risk Category
Risk Category Sample Size Sexual Violent
Low (0, 1) 257 0.09 0.16
Medium-Low (2, 3) 410 0.18 0.32
Medium-High (4, 5) 290 0.37 0.52
High (6+) 129 0.52 0.59
Total (avg. = 3.2) 1086 0.26 0.37
For example, an individual with a score of six or higher on the Static-99
would have a predicted fifteen-year sexual recidivism rate of 52%.
Notably rare in the vast literature examining the Static-99 are studies
addressing the fundamental, bottom-line question: can the Static-99
identify individuals who meet the legal standards for commitment? 5 The
tests presented in this Article help fill that important gap. The profoundly
disturbing answer-given the central role the Static-99 has played in the
commitment of thousands of individuals-is essentially no. That answer
calls into serious question the entire enterprise of sex offender commitment
and, at a minimum, demands the improvement or replacement of the
Static-99.
The general approach of this Article is to develop an instrument that
predicts recidivism roughly as well as the Static-99 (and is better in other
respects), then to ask whether that instrument can identify individuals who
qualify for sex offender civil commitment under the existing legal
standards. Part II situates the present study within current literature and
outlines three problems with the Static-99.16 Part III reports the results of a
new model created and tested in a large dataset.
First, as the creators of the Static-99 have come to recognize, "the
15 But see Richard Wollert, Low Base Rates Limit Expert Certainty When Current Actuarials Are
Used to Identify Sexually Violent Predators: An Application of Bayes's Theorem, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 56 (2006) ("[T]he best available risk-assessment method (i.e., actuarial testing) eventually
points to the conclusion that the recidivism rate for each detainee ... does not meet the commitment
standard."). Two other studies that come closest are: Hart et al., supra note 9, at s61-s63 (showing
how the approximation uses a social science, not legal, standard), and Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl,
Assessing the Legal Standard for Prediction of Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment
Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 33, 40, 60 (1997) (relying on assumptions rather than
individual-level data).
16There are others. E.g., Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect
Science: Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 2-11
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1580016 (analyzing whether future
dangerousness assessments using actuarial tools are responsive to standards contained in sexually
violent predators laws). See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING,
POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 2-3 (2007) (challenging the growing reliance on
actuarial methods).
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original Static-99 did not sufficiently account for age at release.' 17  The
creators have proposed a fix. Part III of this Article outlines a better fix
using a fifteen-state dataset: allowing for age effects throughout the range
rather than using arbitrary cut-offs.
The second shortcoming, also acknowledged by the originators, is that
sexual recidivism rates have fallen since the norms were established. New,
lower norms are needed. In Part III, this Article provides one more data
point in support of that conclusion and suggests an approach that would
more seamlessly adjust to changing crime rates: updating the instrument as
soon as new data become available.
Third, and most fundamentally, the Static-99, even as modified, fails to
report uncertainty in predicted recidivism rates that is essential to
determine whether an individual sex offender meets the commitment
threshold according to the applicable standard of proof. Part II explains
this problem and classifies each jurisdiction with sex offender civil
commitment according to commitment standard and standard of proof.
This Article's alternative prediction model in Part III quantifies the effect
of failing to account for prediction error and demonstrates how this
shortcoming may (or may not) be overcome. The technical solution is
relatively straightforward; the resulting problem, however, is that
essentially no one qualifies for commitment. This is the most important
finding of this Article: an instrument as good as the Static-99 largely fails
to identify any individuals who met the legal standards for commitment.
There may be nothing "inherently unattainable" about predicting future
behavior, but, in this corner of the real world at least, it is more difficult
than present practice admits.
Part IV discusses limitations of the present study-most notably, a
short follow-up period-and identifies implications beyond sex offender
civil commitment. Actuarial risk assessment is pervasive, particularly in
the area of criminal justice.' 8 The Static-99 has perhaps more empirical
grounding than other widely used instruments, and still it appears to fall
short. To illustrate the potentially far-reaching implications of this Article,
similarities to one other very popular instrument, the LSI-R, used for
parole and other purposes, are highlighted.
II. THREE PROBLEMS WITH THE STATIC-99
A. Age
Older people commit fewer crimes. There is a long-recognized inverse
17 Leslie Helmus et al., Static-99R: Revised Age Weights 1, 7 (Oct. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.static99.org (last visited July 1, 2011).
18 HARCOURT, supra note 16, at 2.
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relationship between age and recidivism generally. 19 The review of sexual
recidivism, which ultimately led to the Static-99, listed young age as a
factor.2° The Static-99 does account for young age: as shown in Table 1,
individuals less than twenty-five years old receive an additional point.
However, many have criticized the Static-99 for failing to account for age
throughout the entire lifespan.2' Substantial empirical evidence has
accumulated showing that the risk of sexual recidivism declines with age
well above twenty-five.22  The general conclusion has been that
"recidivism rates decrease in a linear fashion with age-at-release. 23
The largest field validity test to date found that the Static-99 was not a
significant predictor of violent or sexually violent recidivism after
controlling for age at release, prior arrests, and release type (mandatory
supervision versus discharge).24 Of particular relevance for this Article,
age was a highly significant predictor-better than the Static-99.25 On the
other hand, when the analysis was limited to sexually violent recidivism,
age was not a significant predictor, but the Static-99 score was.26 It should
be noted that release type, which was highly significant in both analyses,
was apparently determined in part by the Static-99 score. 27 Static-99 score
also appears to have been used as a screening device elsewhere in the
process.28 Using the Static-99 in both these ways would tend to artificially
reduce its observed predictive power. Still, the overall finding is that age
tends to add predictive power beyond the Static-99.
Hanson and Thornton (with two co-authors) responded to this growing
evidence on the Static-99 website.29  First, they confirmed through
regression analysis that age was a significant predictor of recidivism even
while controlling for the Static-99 score.3° Second, they formulated a new
19 JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL
TECHNIQUES 32, 105-07 (1981); see also Robinson, supra note 1, at 1451.
20 R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussi6re, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual
Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 351 (1998).
21 E.g., TERENCE W. CAMPBELL, ASSESSING SEX OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS 76
(2004). This criticism applies to all of the five most commonly used ARAIs. See Howard E. Barbaree
& Ray Blanchard, Sexual Deviance Over the Lifespan: Reductions in Deviant Sexual Behavior in the
Aging Sex Offender, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT 38 (D. Richard
Lewis & William T. O'Donohue eds., 2008).
22 Barbaree & Blanchard, supra note 21, at 38, 46, 48-50; LEAM A. CRAIG ET AL., ASSESSING
RISK IN SEX OFFENDERS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 62-67 (2008).
23 Howard E. Barbaree et al., The Development of Sexual Aggression Through the Life Span: The
Effect of Age on Sexual Arousal and Recidivism Among Sex Offenders, 989 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 59,
67 (2003). Accord Learn A. Craig, The Effect of Age on Sexual and Violent Recidivism, 55 INT'L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 75, 77 (2009).
24 Boccaccini et al., supra note 10, at 298 tbl.4.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id at 292-93, 293 tbl.2.21 Id. at 305.
29 Helmus et al., supra note 17, at 1-6.
" ld at 2-3.
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scoring system for age-specifically, ages 18-34.9, +1 point; 35-39.9, 0
points; 40-59.9, -1 point; and 60 or older, -3 points. 3' Third, they reran the
regressions using the modified Static-99 scores. Age was no longer
statistically significant,32 leading Hanson and Thornton to conclude that
"the original Static-99 did not sufficiently account for age at release,
whereas the revised scale does. 33
This response is unsatisfactory. To be sure, four age categories are
better than two, but the real question is why categorize at all? Why not just
include age as a continuous variable and let the regression equation assign
it the weight that optimizes the model's predictive power? That is the
approach of this Article: to propose a methodology rather than a universal
solution. Presumably, the reason Hanson and Thornton resist this approach
is attachment to the notion that their instrument needs to be simple enough
to be performed with pencil, paper, and no calculator. But Hanson and
Thornton have already elsewhere suggested movement away from this
model: a computerized coding form, for example, could virtually eliminate
logical and arithmetic errors.34 Computerization could just as easily
eliminate the conceptual error of applying crude actuarial methods rather
than more powerful statistical techniques like logistic regression.
Failing to use age reasonably is arguably unconstitutional.35  Due
process dictates that a police officer "may not choose to ignore information
that has been offered to him or her.",36  This does not translate into a
constitutional duty to investigate, but it does entail a duty not to turn a
blind eye to relevant evidence.37 The same principle should apply to
adjudicating sex offender civil commitments. "[R]equirements of notice
and hearings are of little significance if the decisionmaker ultimately
ignores any information before it."'38 The Static-99, both the original and
revised versions, effectively throws out relevant information by lumping
individuals into broad age categories.
One response to this argument is that the Static-99 is not the only piece
of evidence considered, and the Constitution generally constrains the total
package, not each constituent part. Decision-makers are free to factor age
into the equation, notwithstanding its inclusion in the instrument. That
3 d. at 4-5.321d. at5.
" Id. at 6.
34 R. Karl Hanson et al., Predicting Recidivism Amongst Sexual Offenders: A Multi-site Study of
Static-2002, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 198,208 (2010).
31 Others have argued that use of instruments like the Static-99 with older offenders "could be
considered to be discriminatory." See, e.g., Prentky et al., supra note 8, at 376.
36 Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11 th Cir. 2004).
37 Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334, 341-42 (6th Cir. 2007).
38 Mark Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L.
REV. 161, 217 (1989) (citing Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476 (1986)).
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may be true, but it is almost certainly not the case that decision-makers'
informal consideration of age always accurately reflects the true impact of
age on recidivism.39 Of course, the government need not wait for a perfect
instrument,40  but using one that throws away obviously relevant
information seems irrational. A second response is that expert testimony
based on the Static-99 may not be state action. The nuances of the state
action doctrine are outside the scope of this Article; however, there is at
least one state where use of the Static-99 is unequivocally state action:
Virginia requires its use by statute.4'
B. Norms
The recidivism rates reported in Table 2 were derived from prisoners
released from three penal institutions in Canada and one in the United
Kingdom. 42 This should immediately give pause to those who would rely
on Table 2 to estimate the likelihood of recidivism for a prisoner in the
United States because "the rate of sexual assault in Canada . . . is more
than twice that of the United States. '43  Moreover, the prisoners in the
normative sample were released between the late 1950s and early 1990s.
Crime, including sexual offenses, peaked in the early 1990s and has been
declining since then.44
Given these facts, it should not be surprising that studies have
generally found recidivism rates below the Static-99 normative levels.45
Hanson, Thornton, and Leslie Helmus, in more recent and diverse samples,
found that "sexual recidivism was two-thirds (66%) the rate of the original
sample. '4 6  There were significant differences among the samples, so,
rather than simply adjust the recidivism rates downward based on the
39 See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
40 Cf Boccaccini et al., supra note 10, at 306 (explaining that governments use instruments that
are most effective for their own contexts).
41 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-903 (2006); see also CAL. ANN. PENAL CODE § 290.04(b)(1) (West
2006) (requiring use of Static-99 for registration of sex offenders).
42 Hanson & Thornton, supra note 12, at 123-24.
43 John A. Fennel, Punishment by Another Name: The Inherent Overreaching in Sexually
Dangerous Person Commitments, 35 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 37, 59 (2009).
" Leslie Helmus et al., Reporting Static-99 in Light of New Research on Recidivism Norms, 21
THE FORUM 38, 38 (2009).
45 Boccaccini et al., supra note 10, at 304; see also PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 1, 1 (2003), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf (stating that 5.3% of released sex offenders were
rearrested within three years for a sex crime); cf Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Predicting the Likelihood of
Future Sexual Recidivism: Pilot Study Findings from a California Sex Offender Risk Project and
Cross-Validation of the Static-99, 35 J. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 454, 465 (2007) (explaining that
Static-99 under-predicted recidivism at scores of two and three and over-predicted at four through six).
46 Helmus et al., supra note 44, at 39. But see Grant T. Harris & Marnie E. Rice, Characterizing
the Value of Actuarial Violence Risk Assessments, 34 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAV. 1638, 1643 (2007)
(finding no support in five sources cited for the proposition that recidivism rates fell along with overall
crime rates).
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overall results, the authors provided two estimates for each recidivism type
and time period: one lower number for "routine" samples and a higher
number for "preselected high risk" samples.47 Evaluators are advised to
report both the low- and high-end values, then to exercise judgment in
opining which sample the individual more closely resembles.48 However,
the authors concede that the preselection factors that would place an
individual into one of the two categories "are not fully known and would
vary across samples. ' 49
This "New Norms" article has called into serious doubt use of the
Static-99. In State v. Rosado,5° the sex offender respondent wanted to
introduce his Static-99 score of four in the civil commitment proceedings.5"
The court granted the state's motion in limine to exclude the evidence,
stating "in view of the recent development of the new norms, and an
entirely new and undeveloped methodology for applying those norms, it
cannot be said that the new norms of the STATIC-99 (despite its past
acceptance) are now sufficiently understood and accepted in the relevant
scientific community under Frye ....
Supporters of the Static-99 appear caught between a rock and a hard
place: they can either fail to account for changes in recidivism rates and
generate flawed estimates, or they can adjust their calculations and risk
being excluded because the new adjustment is not yet generally accepted in
the scientific community. "[T]he development of ARA [actuarial risk
assessment], like all good science, is evolutionary. 5 3 One way for the
Static-99 to evolve is suggested by a section of the "New Norms" article
that the Rosado court did not mention. In it, the authors provide relative
risk values for each Static-99 score up to 9+.54 Applying those values to
the actual recidivism rate for the relevant population would be one
reasonable way to generate estimates, at least until there is time for a
validation study in that population. 55
This Article will outline a methodology that nearly automatically
adjusts to changes not just in the overall recidivism rate, but also in the
47 Helmus et al., supra note 44, at 41 tbls. I & 2. Presumably reflecting the larger sample size, the
authors also reported values for each Static-99 score up to 10+. Id41 Id. at 40.
49 id.
'0 889 N.Y.S.2d 369 (2009).
" Id. at 372-75.
52Id. at 416. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (stating the standard for
the admissibility of scientific evidence in New York).
53 Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex
Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1443, 1445 (2003).
54 Helmus et al., supra note 44, at tbl.3.
" See Calvin M. Langton et al., Reliability and Validity of the Static-2002 Among Adult Sexual
Offenders with Reference to Treatment Status, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 616, 638 (2007) ("Clearly,
likelihood ratios require examination before recidivism probabilities associated with any risk
assessment instrument's scores for one population are assumed to apply to another population.").
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relative predictive power of included variables. Because the proposed
methodology is constant, it would arguably not be subject to challenges
like the one that succeeded in Rosado.
C. Error and Standards of Proof
If a risk scale is to be used in applied contexts, then it
is important that the degree of predictive accuracy is
sufficient to inform rather than mislead. Critics could
suggest, for example, that a correlation in the 0.30 range is
insufficient for decision making because it accounts for
only 10% of the variance. Even if such an argument was
[sic] correct. . . , most decision makers are not particularly
concerned about "percent of variance accounted for."
Instead, applied risk decisions typically hinge on whether
offenders surpass a specified probability of recidivism
(e.g., >50%).56
So wrote Karl Hanson and David Thornton in 2000 reporting the
results of an early test of the Static-99, which did in fact show correlations
around 0.30.57 Their statement may be true for certain low-stakes
decisions, but it is frighteningly flawed with respect to sex offender civil
commitment, as explained below.
In the same article, Hanson and Thornton reported fifteen-year sexual
recidivism above their hypothetical 50% threshold for the Static-99 "high"
risk category of 52%.58 The implication is that commitment would be
proper for individuals in that risk category in jurisdictions applying a 50%
threshold. That is false. The question is: how sure are we that an
individual in this risk category is more likely than not to reoffend? The
percentage of variance accounted for, and hence prediction error, is
absolutely critical in making that determination. Hanson and Thornton
missed the distinction-explained more than twenty years earlier in the
same journal by John Monahan and David Wexler-between the standard
of commitment and the standard of proof: "one must prove to a given
standard [of proof] only that a specified probability threshold [viz.,
commitment standard] has been crossed .... 59
56 Hanson & Thornton, supra note 12, at 129-30. A correlation of 1.0 means a perfect positive fit
between the predictor and outcome variables; 0 indicates no relationship. The square of the correlation
coefficient is the percentage of variance (or spread) of the outcome variable accounted for by the
predictor. Thus, as the quoted passage states, a 0.30 correlation coefficient corresponds to roughly 10%
of variance accounted for (0.302 = 9%).
7 Id. at 126 tbl.4
58 Id. at 129 tbl.5, 130; see also supra Table 2.
59 John Monahan & David B. Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil
Commitment, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38 (1978); see also M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-
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If the standard of proof in civil commitment were merely a
"preponderance of the evidence" ("POE")60 then, assuming symmetric
error, the distinction would not be important.61  But the United States
Supreme Court, in Addington v. Texas, 62 held that due process requires a
higher standard for civil commitment. The "clear and convincing
evidence" ("CCE") standard was found to be sufficient, though perhaps not
required.63 That standard has been interpreted as proof with greater than
75% confidence. 64 If the commitment standard is greater than 50%, then
the question is whether it is 75% likely that an individual's risk of
recidivism is above that threshold.65  The 52% value in the Static-99
recidivism table may or may not be sufficient evidence of that fact, but
given the modest correlation with recidivism (0.30), that would seem quite
unlikely.
Since 2000, Hanson and Thornton have not been entirely deaf to this
criticism. 66  The Static-2002 is a refinement of the Static-99, and their
revised age-specific recidivism risk tables included, for the first time, 95%
confidence intervals ("CIs"). 67  In other contexts, however, they continue
to omit critical error estimates. In a leading multi-site study of the Static-
2002, Hanson, Thornton, and a co-author once again reported recidivism
Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in its Epistemological Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in
Court Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REv. 1119, 1207-10 (2008) (recognizing the significance of the
standard of proof). However, Browne & Harrison-Spoerl would simply multiply the commitment
threshold by the standard of proof, id. at 1209 n.429, which is inappropriate as explained in the text
below.
60 The POE standard is sometimes described as requiring that a proposition be more likely than
not true. In numbers, this translates into a probability greater than 0.5.
61 D. Mossman & T. Sellke, Avoiding Errors About 'Margins of Error,' 191 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY
561 (2007) (explaining how "statistical decision theory" sometimes leads non-lawyer experts in this
area to ignore the heightened standard of proof).
62441 U.S. 418 (1979).
6 3 Id. at 431-33.
64 C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof" Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence or Constitutional
Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1293, 1328 tbl.5 (1982) (survey of 170 federal judges reported a mean,
median, and mode of 0.75 for the clear and convincing standard); see also United States v. Fatico, 458
F. Supp. 388, 410 tbl. (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (reporting a range of 0.6 to 0.75 in survey of eight federal
district judges); Fredrick E. Vars, Toward a General Theory of Standards of Proof 60 CATH. U. L.
REv. 1, 7-11 (2010) (quantifying the effect of the clear and convincing standard). Quantification is
resisted by many. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological
Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1115, 1147-48 (1987) ("[L]awmakers could
begin to state the standards in numerical terms. That, however, would not be wise. ... ). That
resistance should be somewhat attenuated in this context. For better or worse, commitment thresholds
are framed in probabilistic terms, see infra Table 3, and most of the evidentiary work is performed by
probabilistic or "actuarial" instruments.
65 At least this is the way that sex offender civil commitment statutes are in fact structured: with
separate commitment and proof standards. That is not, however, the only possible reading of
Addington. Arguably, setting the commitment standard below 75% violates Addington.
66 See, e.g., Janus & Prentky, supra note 53, at 1471 (pointing out the "absence of information on
standard errors").
67 Waggoner et al., supra note 11, at 310-11 tbl.3. As explained later in the text, a confidence
interval is another, and more useful, measure of the precision of prediction. See infra p. 178.
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rates for each score, omitting CIs. 6
8
Reporting CIs (when they do) is a substantial improvement over the
original reports. It falls short, however, of answering the key question.
The CIs reported by Hanson and Thornton are group intervals; the legally
relevant statistic is the individual interval. In other words, the Static-99
creators are telling us how confident we can be that the recidivism rate
(e.g., 52%) accurately reflects the rate for the group of individuals in this
risk category (group). A civil commitment decision-maker needs to know
how likely it is the individual before it meets the commitment standard
(individual).
Stephen Hart and his colleagues have estimated an individual 95% CI
on the 52% reported recidivism rate of between 6% and 95%.69 In other
words, if we had a large sample of individuals in the "High" Static-99 risk
category, 95% of them would have a recidivism risk somewhere between
6% and 95%. Some have concluded from this statistic that actuarial risk
assessment, and perhaps sex offender commitment generally, should be
eliminated.70  That may well be the correct conclusion, but the wide
confidence interval alone does not decide the issue.
First, and fundamentally, there is arguably a lack of equivalence
between the statistical concept of a confidence interval and the legal
concept of a standard of proof.71 As Professor David Kaye observes, "the
confidence coefficient is not the probability that [a parameter] lies within
the lonely interval we observed. Rather, it is the long run frequency with
which various and varied CIs would cover the unknown value for [the
parameter]. 72  Two additional facts arguably are needed to bridge the
divide: (1) the probability prior to the subject evidence; and (2) the
probability of the evidence under the alternative hypothesis.73  However,
68 Hanson et al., supra note 34, at 210 tbl.7.
69 Hart et al., supra note 9, at s62 tbl.2.
70 Fennel, supra note 43, at 39, 56, 61. Some suggest that the imprecision of ARAIs may render
them inadmissible under the standards for expert or scientific evidence. Hart et al., supra note 9, at
s64. Others contend that ARAIs clear present admissibility hurdles. For an example of this contention,
see generally Janus & Prentky, supra note 53; see also Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and
Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 293-96 (2006) (discussing the court's "nonchalance" toward
prediction testimony). Even if ARAIs are admissible, their imprecision obviously goes to weight and
whether dangerousness has been established with the requisite certainty.
71 See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1353 n.1 (6th Cir. 1992)
("The confidence interval is not a 'burden of proof in the legal sense; rather, it is a common sense
mechanism upon which statisticians rely to confirm their findings and to lend persuasive power within
their profession.").
72 D.H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 54, 62 (1987). This connection to frequency is why the approach used to generate
CIs is called "frequentist." Id. at 64; see also James M. Curran, An Introduction to Bayesian Credible
Intervals for Sampling Error in DNA Profiles, 4 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 115, 116 (2005).
13 These facts are terms in Bayes Theorem. David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the
Burden of Persuasion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 13, 23. See generally Stanford
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the large sample size in this study (n = 9000) suggests convergence
between the frequentist logit CIs presented and the likely results of the
alternative, Bayesian methodology.74  Thus, although recognizing valid
criticisms, this Article equates CIs with standards of proof,7  at least as a
heuristic device. 6
Second, as Hart and his fellow authors conceded,7 and others further
elaborated,78 their methodology for estimating CIs had shortcomings.
Rehearsing those criticisms here would serve little point, as none of them
apply to the CIs calculated in this Article. Hart et al. responded to their
critics by explaining that they could have used better methodology if
ARAIs were based on logistic regression rather than actuarial methods and
if Static-99 data were made publicly available.79
Finally, 95% is the conventional spread in social science, but the
standard of proof in this context requires a different statistic. Jurisdictions
are split between requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt ("BRD") and
proof by CCE.80 As noted above, the latter standard corresponds roughly
to 75% certainty. BRD is also generally not quantified by courts, but a
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Bayes' Theorem, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem (last
visited Sept. 9, 2011).
14 Kaye, supra note 72, at 69-70; see also M.J. Bayarri & J.O. Berger, The Interplay of Bayesian
and Frequentist Analysis, 19 STAT. SCI. 58, 71 (2004) ("Bayesian and frequentist asymptotic answers
are often (but not always) the same."); Gauri Sankar Datta et al., Bayesian Prediction with Approximate
Frequentist Validity, 28 ANNALS OF STAT. 1414, 1414 (2000) ("It is ... shown that, for any given
prior, it may be possible to choose an interval whose Bayesian predictive and frequentist coverage
probabilities are asymptotically matched.").
75 For further discussion of the application of confidence intervals to legal contexts see Neil B.
Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 399 (1985).
76 See Neil B. Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: A Response to
Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78, 93 (1987) ("I believe that the confidence interval analogy
performs well as a heuristic for the decision making process."); see also Cohen, supra note 75, at 417
("[T]o the extent that the model serves a heuristic rather than a technical function, these problems do
not detract from the model's usefulness"). It is worth noting that even Cohen's most outspoken critic
on this point, Professor Kaye, favors the use of interval estimates, just not as equivalents to standards of
proof. See D.H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1363-64
(1986) (noting the utility of interval estimation); see also Kaye, supra note 72, at 68-69 (exemplifying
how an equalized test can work like a maximum likelihood test). As an alternative method, in footnote
141 infra, I also report results using false positive to false negative error ratios to determine cut-scores.
77 Hart et al., supra note 9, at s63.
78 Harris & Rice, supra note 46, at 1648; Grant T. Harris et al., Shall Evidence-Based Risk
Assessment be Abandoned?, 192 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 154 (2008); Mossman & Sellke, supra note 61,
at 561.
79 S.D. Hart et al., Avoiding Errors About 'Margins of Error': Authors' Reply, 192 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 561, 561-62 (2007) (correspondence).
80 States that demand proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" include Arizona, California, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Nat'l
Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse, "Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators,"
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Sexually/ 20Violent/o20Predators%20and%2OSpecial%2OSentencing.pdf
(downloaded July 8, 2010). States that require "clear and convincing evidence" include Florida,
Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, Virginia. Id. For a complete classification of state's burden of
proof requirements, see infra Table 3.
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survey of 171 judges yielded a mean, median, and mode of 90%.81
Shifting to a 75% or 90% CI, however, is not the right way to
operationalize these standards of proof. Because the commitment question
is whether an individual has a risk greater than a given threshold, only one
tail of the error distribution matters. Assuming symmetric error, applying
the CCE standard (75%) therefore requires calculation of the 50% CI: 25%
of the error will be below the bottom end of the interval. If that lower
bound is above the commitment standard, then commitment is
82appropriate. Figure 1 illustrates, assuming a normal error distribution.
Figure 1. Lower Bound of 50% Confidence Interval ("CI") Is the
Threshold for Clear & Convincing Evidence (75%)
0.5
75%
25% + 50%CI 25%
0 I tiI
-3 -2 -1 0 2 3
Standard Deviations
This new approach can be applied to the 52% figure with its 6% to
95% range. Assuming a normal error distribution, the lower range of the
50% CI is around 37%. This means there is a 75% chance that the
individual recidivism rate is above 37%. That is not enough to clear a
"more likely than not" commitment standard, but it is substantially better
81 McCauliff, supra note 64, at 1325, tbl.2. For further information of quantifying BRD, see Vars,
supra note 64, at 22-23, and Peter Tillers & Jonathan Gottfried, Case Comment-United States v.
Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N. Y 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim that Proof
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt is Unquantifiable?, 5 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 135, 141-51 (2006).
82 This approach was suggested by Professor Cohen. See Cohen, supra note 75, at 421 ("The
difference [between CCE and POE], however, also could be that the clear and convincing standard
requires the factfinder to use a higher level of confidence in constructing the interval estimate.").
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than the 6% lower bound of the 95% CI would suggest. For BRD the
relevant CI is 80% and the lower bound is around 23%.
Whether values in this range (23-37%) suffice for commitment
depends on the commitment standards. Discerning these standards is not
always easy. Writing in 1997, Eric Janus and Paul Meehl found that no
court or legislature had quantified its standard of commitment. They
assumed that "highly likely" meant 75% and "likely" meant 50%.84 Others
more recently claimed that all the state statutes were clear and, despite
varying language, set a bar of "roughly 70%."85 Some courts and
legislatures have now provided one relatively clear benchmark:
Washington, for example, statutorily requires the likelihood of recidivism
to be "more probably than not., 86  At least one commentator87 and two
courts88 have suggested that "likely" is a lower bar.
Into this morass it is with some trepidation that this Article presents
Table 3, illustrating the diversity of both commitment and proof standards:
83 Janus & Meehl, supra note 15, at 40, 60. Janus essentially reiterated this point in 2006, calling
the thresholds "poorly defined" and "vague." Prentky et al., supra note 8, at 360, 372.
" Janus & Meehl, supra note 15, at 41.
85 George G. Woodworth & Joseph B. Kadane, Expert Testimony Supporting Post-Sentence Civil
Incarceration of Violent Sexual Offenders, 3 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 221, 227 (2004).
86 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(7) (West 2008).
87 Jackson & Hess, supra note 11, at 439 ("The highest estimate of risk [on the Static-99] is 52%
over 15 years. Clearly, 52% barely passes the 'more likely than not' criteria established by many
states, but may be more than sufficient in a state adopting the language of simply 'likely."'); see also
Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Is it Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future Violence?, 16 LAW
& HUMAN BEHAV. 621, 627 (1992) ("Given accurate and scientifically supportable predictive
testimony about degree of risk, it is up to society (usually its representative on the bench) to determine
whether 40%, 30%, or even 20% risk of future violence might reach a threshold justifying a particular
legal intervention.") (internal citations omitted).
88 Fennel, supra note 43, at 39 (reporting on California and Massachusetts court opinions).
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Table 3. Standards of Commitment and Proof by State
Commitment
Standard Proof Standard
Likelihood of Clear and Convincing Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
recidivism Evidence (75%) (90%)
>50% Minn., 9 N.J.90  Ariz.,
9 1 111.92
50% Mo., 93 Neb.
94  Iowa,95 Wash., 96 Wis.
97
<50% Fed.,98 Fla.,99  Cal.,' 00 Mass.'0 '
Unspecified N.H., 10 2 N.Y., 10 3 N.D., 104  Kan., 10 6 S.C.,0 7 Tex. 1 8
Va. 10
5
89 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09(1)(A) (West 2007) ("clear and convincing evidence"); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 253B.185 (West 2007) (same); In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Minn. 1999)
("highly likely").
90 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.32(a) (West 2008) ("clear and convincing evidence"); In re
Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 218 (N.J. 2002) ("highly likely").
91 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(A) (2009) (West) ("beyond a reasonable doubt"); In re Leon
G., 26 P.3d 481, 489 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc) ("highly probable"), vacated on other grounds sub nom.,
Glick v. Arizona, 535 U.S. 982 (2002).
92 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/35(d)(1) (West 2008) ("beyond a reasonable doubt"); In re
Detention of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (I11. App. 2001) ('much more likely than not').
93 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 2006) ("more likely than not"); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
632.495(1) (West 2011) ("clear and convincing evidence").
94 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1209(1) (2009) ("clear and convincing evidence"); In re G.H., 781
N.W.2d 438, 445 (Neb. 2010) ("more likely than not").
95 IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(4) (West 2006) ("more likely than not"); IOWA CODE ANN. §
229A.7(5)(a) (West 2011) ("beyond a reasonable doubt").
96 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(7) (West 2008) ("more probably than not"); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 2008) ("beyond a reasonable doubt").
97 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(1m) (West 2007) ("more likely than not"); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
980.05(3)(a) (West 2007) ("beyond a reasonable doubt").
9' 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2006) ("serious difficulty in refraining"); 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006)
("clear and convincing evidence"); United States v. Hunt, 643 F. Supp. 2d 161, 180 (D. Mass 2009)
("[T]his court does not construe the 'serious difficulty' criterion for commitment to require proof of
any statistical probability of reoffense.").
99 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917(1) (West 2011) ("clear and convincing evidence"); Hale v. State,
891 So. 2d 517, 520 (Fla. 2004).
"00 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (West 2010) ("beyond a reasonable doubt"); People v.
Superior Court (Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 968 (Cal. 2002) (stating that "'likely ... does not mean the risk
of reoffense must be higher than 50 percent,"' but instead means the person "presents a substantial
danger-that is, a serious and well-founded risk-of reoffending").
901 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 14(d) (2003) ("beyond a reasonable doubt"); Commonwealth v.
Boucher, 780 N.E.2d 47, 53 (Mass. 2002) (defining "'likely' not as "'more likely than not,"' but
rather as "would reasonably be expected").
12 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2(VI) (2010) ("potentially serious likelihood"); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 135-E:l 1(1) (2010) ("clear and convincing evidence"); State v. Paradis, 455 A.2d 1070,
1072 (N.H. 1983) ("dangerous").
103 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(e) (McKinney 2011) ("likely to be a danger to others"); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(d) (McKinney 2011) ("clear and convincing evidence").
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Table 3 and the accompanying notes illustrate two important points:
(1) there is great diversity across states in approaches on both standard of
commitment and standard of proof; and (2) with the exception of the
relatively precise "more likely than not" standard, the vague statements of
commitment standards strongly suggest that there is no uniformity within
most states either.109  On the second point, commentators have
recommended quantification "so that the true distribution of the risk of
error in prediction can be seen."' 10 This would reveal the otherwise hidden
policy tradeoffs." 1 The debate about quantification is, as in other contexts,
partly about who one wants to make these tradeoffs. 12  By adopting
numerical standards, legislatures and appellate courts can shift discretion
away from trial courts, juries, and testifying experts. Doing so advances
the goals of transparency and consistency, but at the price of case-specific
flexibility." 3
One argument for flexible standards in this context deserves special
attention. The likelihood of recidivism is only one component in
determining the gravity of the threat posed by a particular sex offender;
also relevant are the magnitude of future harms, their frequency, and their
imminence." 4 Sex offender commitment statutes generally do not capture
these other elements, but case-specific adjustment of the required
probability level might (e.g., "menace"). Current ARAIs may aggravate
the problem: "existing actuarial methods are optimized to predict the most
common but least severe sexual offenses."'"1 5  Of course, ARAIs and
statutes could be adjusted to address the problem without sacrificing
104 N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2009) ("clear and convincing evidence"); In re B.V., 708
N.W.2d 877, 882 (N.D. 2006) (stating that defining "likely" as "of such a degree as to pose a threat to
others... 'prevents a contest over percentage points and the results of other actuarial tools').
105 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-908(C) (2005) ("clear and convincing evidence"); Shivaee v.
Commonwealth, 613 S.E.2d 570, 577 (Va. 2005) ("a menace to the health and safety of others")
(internal quotations omitted).
106 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(c) (2005) ("menace"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2005)
("beyond a reasonable doubt").
10' S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(9) (2010) ("pose a menace"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A)
(2010) ("beyond a reasonable doubt").
108 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003(a)(2) (West 2010) ("likely"); Beasley v.
Molett, 95 S.W.3d 590, 600 (Tex. App. 2002) ("The term 'likely,' as ordinarily defined, means
'probable.' Something that is probable is beyond a mere possibility or potential for harm."). TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(a) (West 2010) ("beyond a reasonable doubt").
109 See Jason A. Cantone, Rational Enough to Punish, but too Irrational to Release: The Integrity
of Sex Offender Civil Commitment, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 693, 712-13 (2009) (noting that vague legal
standards may lead to lack of uniformity).
'10 Janus & Meehl, supra note 15, at 34.
.I d; cf Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 87, at 627.
112 Vars, supra note 64, at 21-22.
14 Janus & Prentky, supra note 53, at 1449.
"1 Sreenivasan et al., supra note 45, at 466.
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transparency and consistency, but decision-maker discretion with non-
quantified risk thresholds is perhaps a next best solution.
The diversity of approaches shown in Table 3 underscores the
importance of the fact that ARAIs like the Static-99 are meaningful only
when confidence intervals are properly understood and reported. There are
at least six possible combinations of standard of proof and standard of
commitment. The state-specific combination must be factored into any
ultimate opinion based on an ARAI. And experts are making such
judgments as a matter of routine. Ninety-five percent of evaluators
reported using the Static-99 "always or most of the time," and the same
percentage "reported that it was either essential or recommended for an
evaluator to state an ultimate opinion regarding whether a sex offender
meets civil commitment criteria in their final report."
'
"
16
Whether or not one favors quantification of the commitment and proof
standards, one should favor quantification of the likely error associated
with the Static-99 or other ARAIs. The recidivism tables and risk
categories are at best misleading in the absence of confidence intervals.
No one-not an expert, a trial court, a jury, an appellate court, nor a
legislature--can balance the costs and benefits of sex offender
commitment without some sense of the error of actuarial prediction."
17
Experts are ethically bound to report the limitations of actuarial results.
1 8
Actuarial and other statistical methods have the potential to generate both
risk estimates and confidence intervals on those estimates." 9 Parts III and
IV of this Article realize that potential for a new model and consider what
the results mean for risk assessment generally.
This Article follows in the footsteps of Janus and Meehl. 2° Given
certain assumptions about the meaning of commitment standards (e.g.,
"likely" = 50%; "highly likely" = 75%),12' accuracy of prediction (0.75), 122
n6 Jackson & Hess, supra note 11, at 434, 435.
"Id. at 439.
ns Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 87, at 630 (explaining that an expert has an ethical duty of
"presenting reliable testimony and clearly explaining its limitations"); Stephen D. Hart et al., A Note on
Portraying the Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 696 (1993) ("In the
context of psycholegal assessments, unwillingness to qualify one's confidence in violence predictions
or failure to make probabilistic statements regarding the likelihood of future violence is, at best, poor
practice; at worst, it is simply unethical."); Randy K. Otto & John Petrila, Admissibility of Testimony
Based on Actuarial Scales in Sex Offender Commitments: A Reply to Doren, 3 SEX OFFENDER L. REP.
1, 15 (Dec./Jan. 2002) ("[T]here is an obligation on the part of experts to be as precise as possible not
only about their testimony, but about the limitations on the tests that underlie their testimony.").
19 Janus & Prentky, supra note 53, at 1493. Some have suggested that this is impossible. See
Gina M. Vincent et al., The Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments in Sex Offenders, in SEX
OFFENDERS: IDENTIFICATION, RISK ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND LEGAL ISSUES 71 (Fabian M.
Saleh et al. eds., 2009) (asserting that estimates "cannot be done with known precision").
20 Janus & Meehl, supra note 15.
.
1
.Id. at 41.
1221 d. at 49.
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and the base rate of recidivism (2045%), 123 Janus and Meehl concluded
that it was possible to meet the commitment standard. Notably, the
standard of proof was simply folded into standard of commitment with no
downward adjustment in the likelihood of recidivism. 124  This Article
corrects that methodological error1 25 and replicates, for a particular
prediction model and dataset, what Janus and Meehl attempted as a matter
of theory. This Article makes no assumptions about accuracy or base
rate,126 but rather lets the data set those values. Nor does this Article
assume a single cut-score. 127 Finally, this Article goes farther than Janus
and Meehl by pointing the direction toward better ARAIs.
George Woodworth and Joseph Kadane also examined a particular
ARAI-in their case another pre-existing instrument-the Mn-SOST-R.
128
That instrument shares the deficiencies of the Static-99 as described above.
Furthermore, Woodworth and Kadane collapsed standards of commitment
into a single, unsupported cut-off and ignored standards of proof
entirely. 129 Despite these limitations, the present Article agrees with and
implements their suggestion that logistic regression can improve upon less
sophisticated, "actuarial" methods.
130
In perhaps the closest precursor to the present Article, Richard Wollert
applied Bayesian techniques to evaluate several ARAIs, including the
Static-99. 31 Wollert apparently followed Janus and Meehl in assuming a
recidivism threshold of between 50% and 75%. 132 He not only found that
the studied instruments failed to identify even one individual qualified for
commitment, but concluded that the instruments would always fail unless
base rate recidivism rose above 25%. 133 Wollert again used a single cut-
off, but this Article confirms his basic results using corrected commitment
criteria and much different methodology.
113 Id. at 51.
124 Id. at 43.
125 use the term "error" descriptively, not normatively. Jurisdictions in fact decouple the
commitment standard and standard of proof. Whether that bifurcated approach is defensible (or
constitutional) is outside the scope of this Article.
126 See Dennis M. Doren & Douglas L. Epperson, Great Analysis, but Problematic Assumptions:
A Critique of Janus and Meehl (1997), 13 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. REs. & TREATMENT 45, 46-48 (2001)
(arguing that the assumed base rate was too low).
127 See id. at 49-51 (noting that Janus and Meehl assume a single, definitive cut-score).
128 See Woodworth & Kadane, supra note 85, at 231.
129 See id. at 227 ("[W]e believe that the legislatures intend and the courts require a probability of
roughly 70%."); id. at 239 (treating recidivism percentage equal to or greater than commitment
standard as sufficient to justify commitment).
130 Id. at 239.
131 Wollert, supra note 15.
132 Id. at 58.
"' Id. at 75, 79.
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III. A NEW MODEL
A. Data
The data for this study are taken from a United States Department of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS") database. 134  That database
includes all prior criminal history information and recidivism over a three-
year follow-up period for 38,624 sampled prisoners released from prisons
in fifteen states in 1994.13' The data were chosen for several reasons: (1)
the dataset is very large and therefore comes closest to representing the
United States as a whole, and (2) it covers a time period in which sex
offender commitment was not yet prevalent. Thus, it includes every sex
offender, not just those deemed safe enough to release. 136 All violent sex
offenders were included in the BJS study; non-violent sex offenders were
sampled. Because the present study includes both types of sex offenders,
probability weights were used to adjust for sampling. 137
The present study is limited to the 10,400 men in the BJS study who
were incarcerated for a sex offense immediately prior to their release in
1994. Table 4 sets forth some of their relevant characteristics.
134 Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994: [United States] (ICPSR Study No. 3355).
135 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS
RELEASED IN 1994: [UNITED STATES], CODE3OOK iii (2002) [hereinafter CODEBOOK].
The states are: Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. Id at iv.
136 Id. at 3. No state in the study had sex offender commitment in 1994, except for Minnesota late
in that year. Since they had expressly not been selected for commitment, individuals released in
Minnesota after the effective date of the sexual offender commitment law were omitted. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 253B.185 (West 2007) (effective Sept. 1, 1994).
"' See CODEBOOK, supra note 135, at 12-13. All analyses were rerun without weights. There
were only trivial changes in results. This was not unexpected as in most cases fewer than fifty
individuals had probability weights not equal to one. Along the same lines, excluding non-violent sex
offenders had no significant impact on the results. Such offenders made up about 3% of the total and
were mostly serving time for statutory rape or incest. See infra Table 4.
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Table 4. Summary Statistics (Unweighted)
Number Percentage
Offense
Rape 2407 23.1%
Statutory Rape 282 2.7%
Incest 59 0.6%
Sexual Abuse 3856 37.1%
Child Molestation 3278 31.5%
Sodomy 518 5.0%
Race/Ethnicity
Black 3238 31.1%
Hispanic 1697 16.3%
Ag
<25 1340 12.9%
25-35 3733 35.9%
35-50 4141 39.9%
>50 1177 11.3%
Age is missing for nine individuals.
Due to missing data, roughly 15% of the total sample was excluded: the
key regression presented below in Table 5 is based on 8881 instead of
10,400 observations.
138
B. Methodology
This Article employs the BJS data to shed light on current sex offender
commitment practice. This is not a direct test of the efficacy of the Static-
99, because data including Static-99 scores have not been made publicly
available. Rather, more sophisticated statistical tools are used to
demonstrate the points made above regarding age, norms, and error. Most
fundamentally, the data are used to estimate how many individuals met the
legal standards for commitment, and how error of prediction affects that
estimate. The primary data analysis tool is logistic regression. It is a
commonly-used model in social science for true dichotomous outcomes,
138 By far the largest source of missing data is the lack of arrest data. Every convict must have
been arrested at least once, so observations without any arrests were dropped. In contrast, I retained
observations with one or more arrest charge and additional charges coded as "missing" or "unknown."
A strict reading of the Codebook would exclude such individuals because known negatives should have
been coded "not applicable." See CODEBOOK, supra note 135, at 13-14. Such a reading, however,
would in almost every case contradict the recorded number of charges per arrest (e.g., variable name =
AOOICNT).
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like recidivism. Technical details of the methodology are presented in the
Appendix.
C. Results
1. Age
As described above, the original Static-99 converts the continuous
variable age into a dichotomous variable with "Young" equal to one if the
offender is less than twenty-five years old at the time of release. 39 Even
the creators of the Static-99 admit that this was a mistake. One obvious
question is whether a more refined treatment of age, on its own, can predict
recidivism as well as or better than the Static-99. The answer is mixed.
Age alone does as well as the Static-99 in predicting violent (both sexual
and non-sexual) recidivism, but not as well in predicting sexual (both
violent and non-violent) recidivism.
The present study includes two continuous age variables: age at first
arrest and age at release. Squared and cubed versions of each are also
included to allow non-linear effects. 40 Two logistic regression (or "logit")
models estimated the likelihood of recidivism using these six age variables
alone. The mean predicted likelihood for the group that was arrested for a
subsequent violent offense was significantly higher than the group that did
not recidivate violently: 30.6% versus 24.6% (Cohen's d = 0.58 [95% CL =
0.53, 0.63]). This effect size-a measure of the strength of association
between two variables-matches that of the Static-99. A recent meta-
analysis of thirty-five studies of the Static-99's predictions of violent
recidivism found a mean Cohen's d equal to 0.57, with a 95% CI of 0.52 to
0.62.141
Sexual recidivism is a different story. The same Static-99 meta-
analysis found a mean Cohen's d of 0.67 in predicting sexual recidivism
with a 95% confidence interval of 0.62 to 0.72. For the age-only logit
model described above, the Cohen's d was only 0.30 (95% CI = 0.23,
0.38). Hence, the Static-99 was significantly better than age alone at
predicting sexual recidivism.
But that is not really a fair comparison. The Static-99 includes nine
variables other than age. Five variables assess prior involvement with the
criminal justice system. The question, then, is can the combination of the
two continuous age variables, two criminal history variables, and superior
methodology (logistic regression) compete with the Static-99 in predicting
139 See supra Table 1.
'40 This is in some ways a less constrained version of Prentky et al., supra note 8, at 376-77, who
concluded that recidivism estimates should be reduced by two percent for every year after age forty.
The results reported in Table 5 suggest a large negative effect of age throughout the range of released
individuals.
141 See infra, Appendix (defining Cohen's d).
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sexual recidivism? The new model adds two sets of variables closely
mimicking two items on the Static-99: (1) a dummy variable equal to one
if the individual has a prior conviction for a violent offense (along with
another dummy equal to one if offense code was missing); and (2) a set of
dummy variables based on the number of prior arrests for sexual offenses
(0 or 1; 2 or 3; 4, 5, or 6; and 7 or more). Table 5 reports the results.
Table 5. Logit Regression Predicting Rearrest for Sexual Offense
Number of obs = 8881
Pseudo R2 = 0.0557
Area under ROC curve* = 0.6605
Log likelihood = -2591.4108 Cohen's d = 0.761
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z P>Izl [95% Conf Interval]
Age at
Release -0.000384 0.000351 -1.09 0.275 -0.00107 0.000305
... squared 3.31E-08 2.53E-08 1.31 0.191 -1.7E-08 8.26E-08
... cubed -9.33E-13 5.89E- 13 -1.58 0.113 -2.1E-12 2.21E-13
Age at First
Arrest 1.06E-04 1.52E-04 0.70 0.485 -1.92E-04 4.05E-04
... squared -2.19E-08 1.36E-08 -1.61 0.108 -4.86E-08 4.81E-09
... cubed 7.86E-13 3.91E-13 2.01 0.045 1.92E-14 1.55E-12
Violent Prior Conviction?
...yes -0.220320 0.110261 -2.00 0.046 -0.436428 -0.004211
... missing 0.420117 0.201135 2.09 0.037 0.025900 0.814334
Sexual Prior Arrests
... 0 or 1 -1.494985 0.230609 -6.48 0.000 -1.946970 -1.043000
... 2 or 3 -0.875472 0.227590 -3.85 0.000 -1.321540 -0.429404
.4, 5, or 6 -0.289424 0.270223 -1.07 0.284 -0.819052 0.240205
.6 or more 0.023862 0.561787 0.04 0.966 -1.077220 1.124945
Constant 0.719014 1.414187 0.51 0.611 -2.052742 3.490770
Based on unweighted regression
Perhaps not surprisingly, the most significant predictor of sexual
recidivism was a significant number of prior arrests for sexual offenses.
But more important for the present Article is the result that better
methodology and more sensitive treatment of age more than compensated
for omitting seven of the ten Static-99 items: the Cohen's d for this
expanded model was 0.76, which is above the 95% CI reported by the
Static-99 meta-analysis. To be sure, the CIs overlap substantially, but it
appears fairly safe to say that the new model does as well or better than the
Static-99.
However, the analysis to this point has been unfair in at least one way
to the Static-99. The meta-analysis reviewed applications of the Static-99
to populations other than the ones with which the instrument was
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developed. In contrast, the logit models have been evaluated with the same
data that was used to construct them. This out-of-sample versus in-sample
comparison is not apples to apples. A properly specified model will
generally perform best in the construction sample. To correct this bias, the
data were split into two parts. The model was constructed using data from
every state other than California and its predictions were tested in
California. California was chosen because it was home to the largest
number of released prisoners, roughly one-third of the total.
The results with respect to violent recidivism stand: the logit model
with two sets of age variables does as well as or better than the Static-99 in
predicting violent recidivism in new samples. Specifically, the Cohen's d
for the out-of-sample logit model was 0.56 with a 95% confidence interval
of 0.48 to 0.64. This Cohen's d is nearly identical to the Static-99.
In contrast, the Static-99 has an edge over the logit model for out-of-
sample prediction of sexual recidivism. The Cohen's d for logit is 0.53
(95% CI = 0.41, 0.65), as compared with 0.67 (95% CI = 0.62, 0.72) for
Static-99. Note that the confidence intervals overlap, so one cannot reject
the hypothesis of equivalence. Recidivism rates vary considerably by race
and ethnicity in this dataset, 14 so including these variables might increase
predictive power, particularly since California's demographics may be
unusual. However, after controlling for age and criminal history, race and
ethnicity actually reduce effect size, strongly suggesting that these
characteristics do not belong in the model.
143
To summarize, the data support using age as a continuous variable
with a technique like logistic regression. A logit model on age at first
arrest and age at release, together with squared and cubed terms allowing
for non-linearity, was better at predicting violent recidivism than the ten-
item Static-99. Adding two sets of criminal history variables made the
logit model nearly as good as the Static-99 in predicting sexual recidivism.
In other words, more sophisticated use of age eliminated the need to collect
additional criminal history information or to code the three Static-99 items
based on victim characteristics. 144 Of course, even greater predictive
power would likely be achievable by including those items in a regression
model.
2. Norms
Recall that recidivism rates vary significantly across time and
jurisdiction. The present study is no exception. As shown in Table 6,
there is wide disparity in the recidivism rates of sex offenders among the
142 CODEBOOK, supra note 135, at 18 tbl. 12 (2003).
143 Consistent with this conclusion, the coefficient on the black variable failed to achieve
statistical significance. However, the Hispanic coefficient was negative and significant (p = 0.008).
144 See supra Table 1.
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fifteen states included in this study.
Table 6. Rearrest Rate by State and Offense Type
State Sexual Violent
Arizona 5.9% 22.8%
California 8.4% 24.6%
Delaware 10.4% 42.9%
Florida 9.7% 28.5%
Illinois 12.2% 39.6%
Maryland 13.5% 40.0%
Michigan 5.7% 13.6%
Minnesota 18.1% 27.1%
New Jersey 6.6% 23.7%
New York 10.0% 26.2%
North Carolina 7.3% 26.6%
Ohio 13.0% 31.2%
Oregon 8.6% 23.8%
Texas 6.7% 23.0%
Virginia 9.3% 27.5%
This disparity suggests that state-specific norms are needed to evaluate an
individual's risk of recidivism. Better evidence would be to find
significant state effects after controlling for age and criminal history.
Dummy variables for fourteen of the fifteen states (the last, Virginia,
was omitted) were added to the sexual recidivism model outlined in the
previous section. 145  The coefficients on two states, Maryland and Texas,
were negative and statistically significant (p < 0.05).146 A chi-square test
rejected the null hypothesis that all the state dummy coefficients were
equal (chi2(14) = 54.01;p <0.0001). The analysis was repeated for violent
recidivism. Here again, the independent variables were based on age and
criminal history, along with state dummy variables. Five state coefficients
were statistically significant at the 5% level (Illinois, Maryland, Michigan,
North Carolina, and Texas). As a result, it is not surprising that overall
there is a highly significant difference among states (chi2( 14) = 106.73; p <
145 For technical reasons, there must always be an omitted reference category for regression
models to work. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND
ECONOMIC FORECASTS 106 (3d ed. 1991). See generally Dummy Variable (Statistics), WIKIPEDIA
(July 4, 2011, 10:38 AM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dummyvariable_(statistics) (footnote omitted)
("If dummy variables for all categories were included, their sum would equal I for all observations,
which is identical to and hence perfectly correlated with the vector-of-ones variable whose coefficient
is the constant term; if the vector-of-ones variable were also present, this would result in perfect
multicollinearity, so that the matrix inversion in the estimation algorithm would be impossible. This is
referred to as the dummy variable trap.").
146 North Carolina had a negative coefficient that came very close to statistical significance (p =
0.054).
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0.0001).
Many factors could explain the significant state effects. The important
point is that significant differences among states persist even after
controlling for factors like those included in the Static-99. Hence, those
creating risk assessment instruments and those using them should seriously
consider state-specific norms.
3. Error and Standards of Proof
Again, the logit model described above predicted sexual recidivism
within sample as well as, or better than, the Static-99. One great advantage
of the logit model is that it is possible to measure the standard error
associated with individual predictions. As a result, one can actually test
whether each released sex offender exceeded the commitment standard
with the requisite degree of confidence. Table 7 summarizes the results.
Table 7. Individuals Who Met the Dangerousness Standards for
Commitment (Out of 8881)*
Commitment Standard Proof Standard
Likelihood of Clear and Convincing Beyond a Reasonable
Recidivism Evidence (75%) Doubt (90%)
> 75% 0 0
> 50% 0 0
> 25% 217 201
2.4% 2.3%
Using predictions and standard errors of model summarized in Table 5
The most striking result is that not one of the 8881 released sex offenders
was more likely than not to be rearrested for a sexual offense-even at the
lower CCE standard. This means that, using the instrument alone, no one
met the dangerousness threshold used in half of the jurisdictions with sex
offender commitment.
147
However, at least four jurisdictions--California, Florida,
Massachusetts, and the federal government-set the bar lower than that: a
less than 50% chance of recidivism (which, again, was arbitrarily set at
147 See supra Table 3. Some have argued that violent recidivism is a better measure among sex
offenders of the conduct civil commitment is designed to prevent. See Mamie E. Rice et al., Violent
Sex Offenses: How Are They Best Measured from Official Records?, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 525, 536
(2006). The analysis was repeated using the logit model described above predicting violent recidivism
using six age variables. Despite a much higher base rate of violent recidivism (about 26%), no one
qualified for commitment at the 75% threshold and around 0.2% at the 50% threshold (out of 9,015
individuals, twenty-three at CCE and nineteen at BRD). However, solid majorities cleared the 25%
hurdle.
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25%). About 2.3% of individuals (201 of 8881) met this standard beyond
a reasonable doubt. Among this most dangerous group, the actual
recidivism rate was very close to 40%. In other words, if these individuals
had been committed, three people who would not have reoffended would
have been detained for every two recidivists. This analysis also showed
that almost 90% of recidivists still would have been released.
148
The contribution of error can be quantified. How many individuals
would have qualified for commitment if the error associated with
predictions were ignored, as the creators of the Static-99 originally
advocated? 149 Still none met the 50% and 75% commitment standards. At
the lowest threshold (25%), however, 242 individuals would have
qualified. In other words, properly factoring in error and applying a higher
standard of proof can reduce commitments identified by the logit model by
up to 17% (242 to 201). The error of individual prediction associated with
an actuarial tool like the Static-99 is likely greater because it rounds
variable effects and lumps individuals into rough categories. 50
IV. DIscussIoN
A. Limitations
This is not a direct test of the Static-99. Nonetheless, the findings
described above illuminate shortcomings of that instrument and other
actuarial approaches. The most important conclusion is that an instrument
as good as the Static-99 generally cannot identify individuals who satisfy
the legal requirements for sex offender civil commitment. By achieving
effect sizes comparable to the Static-99 with more sensitive treatment of
age and fewer variables, this Article provides further support for the view
that the Static-99 does not properly account for age. By showing
significant state effects using a model comparable to the Static-99, this
Article underscores the importance of tailoring predictions to the particular
jurisdiction. And, finally, the Article demonstrates in two different ways
the large impact of prediction error on how many individuals will qualify
for commitment.
1 Woodworth & Kadane, supra note 85, at 239 (reporting somewhat better numbers in direct test
of the MnSOST-R).
149 Recall that this is equivalent to applying the preponderance of the evidence standard.
150 As mentioned above, an alternative to this confidence interval approach to standards of proof
is to set the cut-score in order to achieve a desired ratio of false positives ("FP") to false negatives
("FN"). Normally, these values are unavailable, Cohen, supra note 75, at 417, but here no one was
civilly committed and we have actual data on recidivism. (Notably, this approach is independent of the
commitment threshold and therefore probably not a good fit in this context.) The three standards of
proof can be equated to FP:FN error ratios as follows: POE (50%), 1:1; CCE (75%), 1:3; and BRD
(90%), 1:9. Applying these standards, 479, 346, and 149 individuals, respectively, qualified for
commitment based on the logit predictions and observed recidivism. Thus, the unequal weighting of
errors implied by heightened standards of proof can reduce commitments by up to 69%.
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One criticism of the analysis above is that it is directed against a straw
man: the Static-99 is not used in isolation. Rather, experts testify about the
meaning of the score and offer opinions as to dangerousness that
incorporate other factors. Existing data, however, suggest that adding
clinical judgment to actuarial results does not improve predictive
accuracy.' 5 ' Indeed, to the extent that there have been studies, they suggest
that adjusting actuarial results actually decreases accuracy.15 2
Another limitation is that recidivism information in these data is
available only for the first three years after release. This generates a
relatively low base rate. The observed sexual recidivism rate in the data is
about 9.2%. In contrast, according to some researchers, "approximately
30% of sex offenders released from secure custody will have subsequent
offenses recorded as sexual on police rap sheets."'5 3 On the one hand, the
low base rate makes the large effect sizes more impressive since prediction
of low probability events is more difficult. This bolsters the present
findings on age. But, on the other hand, the low base rate artificially
reduces the number of individuals who qualified for commitment and
perhaps exaggerates the impact of prediction error. One could respond by
arguing that neither effect is "artificial." When spending limited resources,
the imminence of harm is plainly relevant. To prevent one sexual
reoffense by locking up an individual for more than three years is arguably
not cost-benefit justified. That point is, of course, debatable, and it must
be conceded that the short follow-up period covered by the data is a
limitation.
B. Implications
The way we select sex offenders for civil commitment is inadequate:
essentially no one meets the legal standards. To combat this inadequacy,
the practice of sex offender commitment should be curtailed or eliminated,
the selection criteria lowered, or the selection methodology improved. The
first two options involve policy judgments outside the scope of this Article.
151 See Terence W. Campbell & Gregory DeClue, Flying Blind with Naked Factors: Problems
and Pitfalls in Adjusted-Actuarial Sex-Offender Risk Assessment, 2 OPEN ACCESS J. FORENSIC
PSYCHOL. 75, 75 (2010), available at http://www.forensicpsychologyunbound.ws/ ("Based on
available data, at its best, [Adjusted Actuarial Assessment] neither increases nor decreases the accuracy
of actuarial classification."); Hamilton, supra note 16, at 44 ("[Tlhere is no empirical evidence that
modifying actuarial scores improves the accuracy of predictions."); see also Harris & Rice, supra note
46, at 1640.
152 See Campbell & DeClue, supra note 151, at 75 ("At its worst, [Adjusted Actuarial
Assessment] dilutes actuarial accuracy."); R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Accuracy
of Recidivism Risk Assessments for Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of 118 Prediction Studies, 21
PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 1, 7 (2009) ("[T]he adjusted scores showed lower predictive accuracy than did
the unadjusted actuarial scores.").
113 Harris & Rice, supra note 46, at 1642. But see Hanson & Bussi&e, supra note 20, at 351
(reporting 13.4% sexual recidivism).
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This Article does, however, shed light on a way forward for improved
methodology. It should be emphasized that there is no guarantee that
adopting one or even all of the suggestions below will solve the bottom-
line problem.
Specifically, due to the low base rate of recidivism and substantial
prediction error, an instrument as good as the Static-99 identified not one
individual who qualified for commitment at the 50% or 75% threshold.
154
As noted above, half of the jurisdictions with sex offender commitment
apply thresholds at or above 50%.155 No evidence shows that adding other
evidence to actuarial results improves prediction accuracy. 5 6 The obvious
implication is that no one in these jurisdictions deserved to be civilly
committed as a sex offender.
There are several responses to this finding. First, it depends crucially
on the short follow-up period and resulting low base rate. 5 7 Arrest reports
listing sexual offenses may understate recidivism for other reasons as
well-e.g., failure of victims to report and failure of police to list the more
difficult to prove sexual component of offenses like assault. 58 Second, the
other half of jurisdictions have lower or unspecified commitment
thresholds. This Article finds that standard could have been met with
requisite certainty for a significant fraction of the sample. The problem,
therefore, could be described as setting the threshold too high, rather than
as failing to meet an impossible standard.
Still, this Article represents one of the first empirical tests of whether
an instrument like the Static-99 can identify qualified individuals. The
instrument failed to do so in half of jurisdictions. The base rate may be
wrong or those jurisdictions may have the wrong standard, but it would
seem that the burden going forward should be on the developers of ARAIs
like the Static-99 to show that the instruments as revised can identify
individuals who meet the commitment threshold at the required standard of
proof. If no such showing is forthcoming, the entire enterprise of sex
offender commitment is justifiably in doubt. 5 9
The Static-99 can be improved, at least in accounting for age, adjusting
for jurisdiction-specific norms, and reporting error. The developers of the
154 This finding stands in contrast to that of Janus and Meehl, who concluded as a theoretical
matter that those standards could be met. Janus & Meehl, supra note 15, at 33.
155 See supra Table 3.
156 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
157 Observed base rates vary as widely as 7.5% to 66.7%, with two large meta-analyses finding
rates around 13-14% for five-year recidivism. Prentky et al., supra note 8, at 373-74.
'58 Harris & Rice, supra note 46, at 1643-44.
159 Alternatives like longer prison sentences, or supervision and treatment in the community, may
be preferred. See Cantone, supra note 109, at 720-21 (advocating for longer prison sentences); Eric S.
Janus, Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an Empirically-Based Prevention
Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1083, 1132-33 (2003) (advocating for stronger
community-based treatment solutions).
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Static-99 have recognized some of these shortcomings and offered updated
alternatives. Recall that a revised version of the Static-99 includes four
age categories instead of two. 160  This is certainly a step in the right
direction, but why not go all the way and include age as a continuous
variable? By similar token, new norms are necessary-as this Article
confirms' 61-but including dummy variables for each jurisdiction,
updating data each year, and reestimating the logit model outlined above
has the potential to seamlessly adjust predictions as observed behavioral
changes. 62 Because one can directly calculate individual errors using this
approach, a successful challenge along the lines of Rosado would be much
less likely. Reporting such errors provides a critical link between risk
assessment instruments and commitment decisions. In short, a logistic
regression-based approach holds more promise than traditional actuarial
methods.
63
Although this Article focused on the Static-99 and sex offender civil
commitment, the lessons apply more generally to other actuarial
instruments used in other contexts. There are many such contexts. Take,
for example, the following list of criminal applications:
From the use of the IRS Discriminant Index Function to
predict potential tax evasion and identify which tax returns
to audit, to the use of drug-courier and racial profiles to
identify suspects to search at airports, on the highways,
and on city streets, to the use of risk-assessment
instruments to determine pretrial detention, length of
criminal sentences, prison classification, and parole
eligibility, prediction instruments increasingly determine
individual outcomes in our policing, law enforcement, and
punishment practices. 164
The IRS formula is apparently based on regression analysis. 165 In contrast,
drug-courier profiles have never been empirically validated.1
66
The most commonly used risk assessment instrument in this country is
'60 Helmus et al., supra note 17.
161 See supra Section HI.C.2.
162 See Woodworth & Kadane, supra note 85, at 238, 239 (advocating for "a standardized data
base" and presuming that "prediction models will be developed and updated via logistic regression").
163 But see Harris & Rice, supra note 46, at 1639 (noting that "regression weights are unstable on
replication").
164 HARCOURT, supra note 16, at 2.
165 Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne'er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The
Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 147 n.204
(2003).
166 Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial
Review ofInvestigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 845 (1985).
[Vol. 44:1
RETHINKING THE INDEFINITE DETENTION OF SEX OFFENDERS
the Level of Services Inventory Revised (LSI-R). 167 The LSI-R, used for
parole and other purposes, is more extensive but closely analogous in
structure to the Static-99.16' The LSI-R includes a dummy variable based
on age at first arrest, but not age at release. 69 If the goal is predicting
recidivism, failing to include both as continuous variables is a mistake. 7
Failing to weight the items using regression analysis is another defect
shared by the LSI-R. And, finally, reporting logit predictions along with
errors could lead to better decision-making than, as the LSI-R does, merely
lumping individuals into "low," "medium," and "high" risk groups.' 7 ' The
LSI-R demonstrates that the present examination of the Static-99 has
potentially broad importance.
V. CONCLUSION
The Static-99 is the most thoroughly researched tool for predicting
sexual recidivism. 172  Almost no one before this Article, however,
empirically assessed the most critical question: can the Static-99 predict
recidivism well enough to meet the legal standard for sex offender
commitment? 173 The answer is mixed and qualified, but largely negative.
The limitations of this study preclude any strong conclusions, but the
findings at least suggest that the goals and methods of sex offender civil
commitment need to be reevaluated. In the meantime, this Article
identifies several ways in which the Static-99 and like instruments are
deficient and can, and should, be improved.
1
67 TRACY W. PETERS & ROGER K. WARREN, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GETTING
SMARTER ABOUT SENTENCING: NCSC'S SENTENCING REFORM SURVEY 17 (2006), available at
sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2006/Aug2006/documentO9.pdf.
168See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY STUDY OF THE LSI-R RISK
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT i (2003), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt (search
"LSI-R RISK").
'69 Id. at 14 tbl.7.
170 Indeed, a validation study of the LSI-R found the variable "Arrested under age 16" to be
significant in predicting recidivism. Id. at 18.
171 A recent examination of the LSI-R found recidivism predictive power (AUC = 0.66 and 0.73)
comparable to that achieved by this Article's main logit model (AUC = 0.66; supra Table 5). Sarah M.
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APPENDIX
Formally, the logit model is specified as follows:
1
Equation 1. Pi =
l+e-gx ,
where Pi is the probability of an individual hit or miss, e is the base of
natural logarithms, fl is a matrix of coefficients, and X, a matrix of
individual-specific variable values.' 74
Two post-estimation calculations are complex enough to require
explanation. In Table 7, I estimate the number of individuals who met the
legal standards for commitment-for example, whose estimated likelihood
of recidivism was above 50% ("more likely than not") with 75%
confidence (CCE). This required calculating the lower CI for logit
predictions, Pi. I substituted for fiX, in Equation 1 one side of the
following formula:
Equation 2. LBp = LP - (Zp x SELP)
where LBp is the lower-bound of the linear CI for a given proof standard
(75% or 90%), LPi is the linear prediction of the logit model for an
individual, Zp is the inverse cumulative standard normal distribution for
either 75% or 90%, and SELpi is the standard error of LPi.1
75
The Cohen's d statistic is defined as (M - M2)/Sw, where MI is the
mean of one group, M2 is the mean of the comparison group, and Sw is the
pooled-within standard deviation.176 The complicated part of this equation
is the last term:
Equation 3. S,, = (n, - 1)s + (n2 - 1)s
nl +n
where n is group size and s is group standard deviation. 77 The CIs on
17 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC
FORECASTS 258 (3d ed. 1991).
17 See Mark Inlow, Prediction Confidence Intervals After Logistic Regression, STATA (Apr.
1999, rev. July 2007), http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/prep.html. By deriving the confidence
interval from the standard error, this methodology avoids one criticism leveled against Hart et al., supra
note 9. See Harris et al., supra note 78, at 154 ("The appropriate statistic is standard error of
measurement ... ").
176 Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra note 152, at 5. See generally Effect Size, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effect-size (last visited July 4, 2011).
'77 JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 67 equation
2.5.2 (2d ed. 1988); Will Thalheimer & Samantha Cook, "How To Calculate Effect Sizes from
Published Research: A Simplified Methodology," 4 equation I a, available at
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Cohen's d statistics were calculated with the METAN downloadable add-
on to Stata.178 All computations in this Article were performed using
Stata/SE 11.1.
docs.docstoc.com/pdf/.../6aflOeeO-3d03-46ac-bd77-6a17477830e7.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2011); see
also Effect Size, supra note 176.
178 See Ross Harris et al., IDEAS, METAN: Stata Module for Fixed and Random Effects Meta-
Analysis, http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456798.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).

